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1 Introduction
Competitive facility location games are the models of rivaling sellers seeking positions to
maximize their market share. A foundation of competitive facility location games is known
as the ice-cream vender problem by Hotelling [5]. Recently, competitive facility location
games on graphs are widely studied [2, 4, 11]. Such a game on a graph can model, for
example, the process that rumors about some products spread through social networks.
Each competitive firm wants to select several influencers from whom information diffuse
throughout the network efficiently.
In this paper, we focus on two kinds of competitive facility location games. One is
the information diffusion game, which is introduced by Alon et al. [1], and the other is
the discrete Voronoi game discussed by Du¨rr and Tang [3]. In both of these games, each
player selects one vertex on a given graph, and sends his/her message to this selected
vertex. After that, each informed vertex sends the received message to all its uninformed
neighbors in each step. The utility of each player is given by the number of vertices
received his/her message when all the diffusion process is finished. The difference of the
two models is the behavior of the vertices which receive more than one message at the
same time. In the former model, messages vanish due to collisions of messages, and the
diffusion process is prevented at the vertices where collisions occur. In the latter model, on
the other hand, when more than one message arrives to one vertex at the same time, the
vertex receives all of them and the utility is shared equally. Thus, all vertices contribute
to the utility of some players. Note that the game proposed by [10] is different from our
discrete Voronoi game although it uses the same name.
We investigate the existence of Nash equilibria for our games. Nash equilibria are the
stable states of the game in which no player can improve his/her utility by unilaterally
changing to a different strategy. Determining whether Nash equilibria exist and effec-
tively computing them have attracted many researchers in economics, decision making
and computer science. Our interest is on the existence of Nash equilibria in the case of
pure strategies, where each player chooses an action deterministically. We do not deal
with mixed strategies in this paper. Nash equilibria for pure strategies are briefly referred
to as pure Nash equilibria. The existences of pure Nash equilibria for information diffusion
games and discrete Voronoi games are studied by [1, 3]. Du¨rr and Thang [3] showed a
relatively simple graph that does not allow a pure Nash equilibrium for Voronoi games
even though there are only two players.
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This paper characterizes the existence of pure Nash equilibria on small diameter graphs,
path graphs and cycle graphs. After giving formal definitions of information diffusion
games and discrete Voronoi games in Section 2, we discuss the existence of the pure Nash
equilibria for graphs with small diameters in Section 3. In Section 4, we show the complete
characterization of the existence of the pure Nash equilibria in the discrete Voronoi games
and information diffusion games on path graphs. We close the discussion in Section 5 with
some observations for the discrete Voronoi games on trees.
2 Information diffusion game and discrete Voronoi game
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph and N a set of players. Throughout this paper we
always assume G is connected. Suppose that the graph G has n vertices and there are k
players, that is, |V | = n and |N | = k. In both games, a strategy set of each player is V
and a strategy profile of players is a vector x ∈ V N associating each player to a vertex
selected initially.
In the information diffusion game induced by G, each player having own message wants
to spread his/her message to as many vertices in graph G as possible. Each vertex admits
three states: uninformed, informed, and deadlocked. Initially, every vertex is uninformed.
At time one, each player selects one vertex from V and sends his/her message to the
selected vertex. Then, a vertex that is sent only one message, i.e., a vertex selected by
exactly one player, receives the message and turns into the state of informed, while a vertex
that is sent more than one message becomes deadlocked. At time t+1, each informed vertex
that received a message at time t sends the same message to all of its adjacent uninformed
vertices, and these messages are processed in the same way: An uninformed vertex that is
sent only one message receives the message and turns into the state of informed, while an
uninformed vertex that is sent more than one message becomes deadlocked. Deadlocked
vertices do not receive any messages. This diffusion process finishes when there is no
vertex that newly becomes informed. Given a strategy profile x which stands for a vertex
selected by each player at time one, the utility of player i, denoted by Ui(x), is given by
the number of informed vertices that receive the message of player i at the end of the
diffusion process.
In the discrete Voronoi game, we use a notation Cv(x), for a vertex v and a strategy
profile x = (x1, . . . , xk), to represent the set of players i whose selected vertex xi is closest
to v among x1, . . . , xk. Namely, Cv(x) = argmin{d(xi, v) | i ∈ N}, where d(u, v) denotes
the shortest path length between u ∈ V and v ∈ V in G. The utility U˜i(x) of player i in
the discrete Voronoi game is given by
∑{ 1|Cv(x)| | v ∈ V, i ∈ Cv(x)}.
The information diffusion game and the discrete Voronoi game are similar in the sense
that every vertex is assigned to the closest players and utility is given by the number
of vertices assigned to each player. The difference of these two games happens when a
vertex receives more than one message simultaneously. Such vertices will be shared by the
players and the messages will be propagated further in the discrete Voronoi game, while
they remain just in the deadlocked state and the propagation of the messages stops at them
in the information diffusion game. Especially, in the discrete Voronoi game we always have∑
i∈N U˜i(x) = |V | for any x, which does not necessarily hold in the information diffusion
game.
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Given a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xk) and x′ ∈ V , we denote by (x′,x−i) the vector
equal to x but with the ith component replaced by x′, that is, (x′,x−i) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, x′,
xi+1, . . . , xk). A strategy profile x is a pure Nash equilibrium of the information diffusion
game (resp. the discrete Voronoi game), if Ui(x′,x−i) ≤ Ui(x) (resp. U˜i(x′,x−i) ≤ U˜i(x) )
for any player i and any x′ ∈ V .
Throughout this paper, we assume that k ≤ n, otherwise both games have trivial
structures. Namely, a profile is a Nash equilibrium of the information diffusion game if
and only if there are no unoccupied vertices, and it is a Nash equilibrium of the discrete
Voronoi game if and only if the numbers of players located on the vertices differ by at
most one between any two vertices.
3 Existence of pure Nash equilibria on graphs with small
diameter
This section discusses the existence of pure Nash equilibria of our games induced by
graphs having small diameter, which was firstly discussed by Alon et al.[1] for information
diffusion games. The diameter of a graph is defined by the maximum distance between
a pair of vertices, that is, defined by max{d(v, u) | u, v ∈ V }. Alon et al. have shown
that the information diffusion game on a graph whose diameter is at least three may not
possess a pure Nash equilibrium, even for two players. Although their example is given
by a large graph, the smaller graph shown in Figure 1 is also an example on which the
information diffusion game does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, Takehara
et al. [9] have shown the following.
Theorem 1 ([9]) There exists a graph with diameter two such that the information dif-
fusion game induced by it does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium even for two players.
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Figure 1: An Example where Nash equilibria of the information diffusion game does not
exist for two players.
Note that the utilities of the information diffusion games are not given by only distances
of pairs of vertices. Hence, characterization of equilibria by some indicators of graph
distances seems to be difficult. On the other hand, in the discrete Voronoi games, the
utilities are defined by distances of pairs of vertices. Indeed, the diameters are able to
characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibrium for discrete Voronoi games.
Theorem 2 For two players, the discrete Voronoi game induced by any graph with diam-
eter two admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Let v˜ be a vertex of the maximum degree. We shall show that the strategy profile
(v˜, v˜) is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Assume that there exists a vertex x with U˜1(x, v˜) > U˜1(v˜, v˜). Let Γ(v) be the closed
neighbor of a vertex v ∈ V , that is, Γ(v) = {u ∈ V | (u, v) ∈ E} ∪ {v}. Note that
d(x, v) = d(v˜, v) = 2 holds for any v $∈ Γ(x) ∪ Γ(v˜), since the diameter is two. Thus, we
have
U˜1(x, v˜)− U˜2(x, v˜) = |Γ(x) \ Γ(v˜)|− |Γ(v˜) \ Γ(x)|,
which, together with U˜1(x, v˜) > U˜1(v˜, v˜) = U˜2(v˜, v˜) > U˜2(x, v˜) = |V | − U˜1(x, v˜), implies
that |Γ(x) \ Γ(v˜)| > |Γ(v˜) \ Γ(x)|. Thus, we obtain |Γ(x)| > |Γ(v˜)|, which contradicts the
maximality of the degree of v˜. !
For three players, there exists a graph with diameter two such that the discrete Voronoi
game induced by it does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium. For example, the cycle graph
with 4 vertices does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium for three players, as shown in [7].
More generally, we have the following.
Theorem 3 For any k ≥ 3, there exist graphs of diameter 2 on which the discrete Voronoi
games do not admit pure Nash equilibria for k players.
Proof. Consider the join Ct + K¯s of the cycle Ct of size t and the complement K¯s of the
complete graph of size s, i.e., the graph obtained from the cycle Ct by adding vertices
v1, v2, . . . , vs and edges (v, vi) for each vertex v in Ct and vi for i = 1, . . . , s (see Figure 2).
Note that the diameter of Ct + K¯s is two for any t (≥ 4) and s (≥ 1). We show that this
graph with t = k + 1 and s large enough, i.e., the graph Ck+1 + K¯M with M ≥ 2k + 1,
does not admit any pure Nash equilibria for k players.
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Figure 2: Example for Ct + K¯s, where t = 8 and s = 3.
Consider a strategy profile such that there are p players on the cycle Ck+1 and k − p
players on K¯M , where 0 ≤ p ≤ k. Assume this strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
When p = 0, for the utility of a player i on K¯M , the vertex where i locates is shared
by the players on the vertex, and the k + 1 vertices on Ck+1 and the unoccupied vertices
on KM are also shared by k players. Thus the utility of the player i equals to 1h +
k+1
k +
!
k ,
where h is the number of players on the vertex where i locates and ! is the number of
unoccupied vertices on K¯M . We have h ≤ k and ! ≥ 1. Here, if h ≥ 2 and the player
i relocates to an unoccupied vertex on K¯M , then his/her utility becomes 1 + k+1k +
!−1
k
which is larger than the original utility 1h +
k+1
k +
!
k . This contradicts the assumption that
the profile is a pure Nash equilibrium. Hence we can assume that all the players locate on
different vertices on K¯M . In such a strategy profile, the utility U˜i of a player i equals to
4
(k+1)+M
k . However, if this player i relocates to a vertex on Ck+1, his/her utility becomes
U˜ ′i = 1 +
2
k + (M − (k − 1)) > M − k + 2. Hence we have
U˜ ′i − U˜i > (M − k + 2)−
(k + 1) +M
k
=
(k − 1)M − k2 + k − 1
k
,
which is positive when M ≥ 'k + 1k−1( = k + 1. Since we have M ≥ 2k + 1 ≥ k + 1, this
contradicts the assumption that the profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
When 1 ≤ p ≤ k − 1, we observe that each of the p players on Ck+1 receives at least
1 from the vertices of Ck+1 as his/her utility, since otherwise he/she can increase his/her
utility by relocating to an unoccupied vertex on Ck+1. This implies that the k− p players
on K¯M shares at most (k + 1)− p from the vertices of Ck+1 as their utility. Hence there
exists a player j whose utility U˜j is at most 1+
(k+1)−p
k−p . However, if the player j relocates
to an unoccupied vertex of Ck+1, his/her utility U˜ ′j becomes at least 1 +
M−(k−(p+1))
p+1 .
Hence we have
U˜ ′j − U˜j ≥ (1 +
M − (k − (p+ 1))
p+ 1
)− (1 + (k + 1)− p
k − p )
=
M − k
p+ 1
− 1
k − p ≥
M − k
(k − 1) + 1 −
1
k − (k − 1) =
M − 2k
k
,
which is positive for M ≥ 2k + 1, a contradiction.
When p = k, every player locates on the cycle Ck+1. Here, we observe the following
(i) - (iii). Note that all the players on the cycle equally share the vertices on K¯M as their
utilities.
(i) Vertices chosen by no players do not appear sequentially.
Assume two vertices v and v′ that are not chosen by any players appear sequentially
on the cycle. If one player relocates to v, then,as his/her utility, he/she gets 1 from
u and at least 1/k from v′. The case the utility from v′ equals to 1/k occurs only
when all the other k − 1 players on the cycle locates on the vertex next to v′. In
such a case, v has one more unoccupied vertex than v′ in its neighbor and he/she
gets additionally as his/her utility. Hence his/her utility received from the vertices
of the cycle is strictly larger than 1 + 1/k. On the other hand, the k players share
k+ 1 vertices on the cycle. This implies there exists a player whose utility from the
cycle is at most (k+1)/k = 1+1/k. If such a player moves to v, then his/her utility
increases, contradicting the assumption that the profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
(ii) No vertices are chosen by more than two players.
Assume there is a vertex v on the cycle on which three or more players locates. Then,
for his/her utility from the cycle, he/she gets at most 1/3 from v, and at most 1/4
(by (i)) from each of its neighbors if they are unoccupied. So in total he/she gets
at most 5/6 < 1 from the cycle. If he/she relocates to an unoccupied vertex on the
cycle, his/her utility from the cycle becomes at least 1 and his/her utility increases,
contradicting to the assumption that the profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
(iii) Both sides of a vertex located by two players are not chosen by any player.
Assume two players locate on a vertex v on the cycle. Then a player on v receives,
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as his/her utility, 1/2 from v, and at most 1/3 (by (i)) from its neighbor vertex v′ on
the cycle if v′ is unoccupied. Hence, if only one neighbor vertex is unoccupied then
the utility from the cycle is less than 1. If so, he/she can increase his/her utility by
moving to an unoccupied vertex on the cycle, contradicting to the assumption that
the profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
For a pair of adjacent vertices on Ck+1, consider the sum of the numbers of players located
on the two vertices. There are k + 1 such pairs and the total sum of the values equals to
2k, thus the avarage is 2kk+1 < 2. Hence, together with (i), we conclude there exists a pair
of adjacent vertices on Ck+1 such that the sum of the numbers of players located on them
is 1. Assume v1 and v2 are such adjacent vertices that exactly one player is on v1 and no
player is on v2. Let v3 be the vertex on Ck+1 next to v2. By (i) and (ii), the number of
players on v3 is either one or two. If there is exactly one player on v3, then each of the
players on v1 and v3 takes at least 32 as his/her utility from Ck+1. Since the k+1 vertices
of Ck+1 are shared by k players and every player takes at least 1 as his/her utility from
Ck+1, each of the players on v1 and v3 takes exactly 32 and the others takes exactly 1 for
each as their utility from Ck+1. This can occur only when on each vertices other than
v2 exactly one player locates. But, if so, the player on v4 next to v3 can increase his/her
utility by relocating to v3, a contradiction. Assume there are two players on v3. Let v0
be the vertex on Ck+1 previous to v1, and v−1 be the one previous to v0. By (i) and (iii),
there are two cases: exactly one player is on v0, or no player is on v0 and some players are
on v−1. In both cases, the player on v1 can increase his/her utility by relocating to v2, a
contradiction. !
Moreover, there is a graph with diameter three such that the discrete Voronoi game
induced by it does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium for two players. The graph given
by Figure 4 in [3] is such an example.
4 Existence of pure Nash equilibria on path graphs
This section deals with the games induced by a path graph G = (V,E). For convenience,
assume that V is given by a range of integers from 1 to n, that is, V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
E = {(i, i+ 1) | i = 1, . . . , n− 1}. We assume, as is remarked in the end of Section 2, the
number k of the players of the games is at most n.
One may expect that, on path graphs, the discrete Voronoi game and the information
diffusion game have similar equilibrium structures since it seems that the difference is just
that the deadlocked vertices in the diffusion process game are shared by the closest players
in the discrete Voronoi game. However, contrary to this expectation, the structures of pure
Nash equilibria of these two games can be quite different. For example, let us consider the
games on the path with nine vertices and five players (see Figure 3). The strategy profile
x = (2, 3, 5, 7, 8) is a pure Nash equilibrium for the discrete Voronoi game. The utility
of each player is U˜1(x) = U˜3(x) = U˜5(x) = 2 and U˜2(x) = U˜4(x) = 1.5. However, this
strategy profile x is not a pure Nash equilibrium for the information diffusion game, since
x′ = (2, 3, 4, 7, 8) has the utility U3(x′) = 2 which is greater than U3(x) = 1. On the other
hand, although x′ is a pure Nash equilibrium for the information diffusion game, it is not a
pure Nash equilibrium for the discrete Voronoi game, since x′′ = (2, 5, 4, 7, 8) has the utility
U˜2(x′′) = 1.5 which is greater than U˜2(x′) = 1. It is worth investigating the difference
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#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
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Figure 3: An example where Nash equilibria of the information diffusion game and the
Voronoi game are different.
of pure Nash equilibria between the discrete Voronoi games and the information diffusion
games on the path graphs in detail. In the following, we determine when the games on
path graphs have pure Nash equilibria: for the discrete Voronoi game in Section 4.1, and
for the information diffusion game in Section 4.2.
As used in [3, 7], let θ1, . . . , θ! be the distinct vertices chosen by some players in
the strategy profile under consideration. Assume that θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θ!. For each
j = 1, . . . , !, let cj be the number of players who choose the vertex θj . Note that a pair
of θ = (θ1, . . . , θ!) and c = (c1, . . . , c!) represents the strategy profile completely, where∑
j cj equals to the number k of players. We denote the set of vertices between θj and
θj+1 by Lj . That is,
Lj =
 {i ∈ Z | 1 ≤ i < θ1} (j = 0){i ∈ Z | θj < i < θj+1} (1 ≤ j ≤ !− 1){i ∈ Z | θj < i ≤ n} (j = !).
Note that (L0, . . . , L!) has one-to-one correspondence to θ.
For any integer m, define
δ(m) =
{
0 (m : even)
1 (m : odd).
4.1 Discrete Voronoi game
With respect to a strategy profile (θ, c) for the discrete Voronoi game, the utility of a
player who chooses the vertex θj is given by
u˜j(θ, c) =

1
c1
(|L0|+ 1 + ) |L1|2 *) + δ(|L1|)c1+c2 (j = 1)
δ(|Lj−1|)
cj−1+cj +
1
cj
() |Lj−1|2 *+ 1 + ) |Lj |2 *) + δ(|Lj |)cj+cj+1 (1 < j < !)
δ(|L!−1|)
c!−1+c! +
1
c!
() |L!−1|2 *+ 1 + |L!|) (j = !)
provided that ! ≥ 2. For short, if there is no confusion, we write u˜j , instead of u˜j(θ, c).
We first give a characterization of pure Nash equilibria for the discrete Voronoi games
on path graphs. This characterization is obtained from a modification of the property for
the discrete Voronoi games on cycle graphs by [3, 7].
Theorem 4 For the discrete Voronoi game with k players on a path graph with n(≥
4, and, ≥ k) vertices, a strategy profile defined by (θ, c) is a pure Nash equilibrium if and
only if the following holds:
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(V1) cj ≤ 2 for all j = 1, . . . , !.
(V2) |Lj | ≤ )2γ˜* − 1 for all j = 1, . . . , !− 1, |L0| ≤ )γ˜* and |L!| ≤ )γ˜*.
(V3) If cj $= cj+1, then |Lj | is even, for all j = 1, . . . , ! − 1, except in two cases: when
c1 ≥ 2, c2 = 1 and c3 ≥ 2, and when c! ≥ 2, c!−1 = 1 and c!−2 ≥ 2. In the former
case, at least one of |L1| and |L2| is even. Symmetrically, in the latter case, at least
one of |L!−2| and |L!−1| is even.
(V4) If cj = 1 and |Lj−1| = |Lj | = 2γ˜ − 1 for some j = 2, . . . , !− 1, then 2γ˜ is odd.
(V5) (i) If cj = cj+1 = 1 and |Lj−1|+ |Lj |+1 = |Lj+1| = 2γ˜−1 for some j = 2, . . . , !−2,
then 2γ˜ is odd.
(ii) If cj−1 = cj = 1 and |Lj−1| = |Lj |+ |Lj+1|+1 = 2γ˜−1 for some j = 2, . . . , !−2,
then 2γ˜ is odd.
(V6) If c1 = 1 ( resp. c! = 1), then |L1| = 0 (resp. |L!−1| = 0). Additionally, |L0| =
) |L2|+12 * (resp. |L!| = ) |L!−2|+12 *) provided that ! ≥ 3.
Here, γ˜ = min{u˜j | j = 1, . . . , !} is the minimum utility. !
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix. (The statement of this theorem holds for
2n ≥ k, but it is stated for n ≥ k here since we are assuming n ≥ k throughout this paper.
In the appendix, the proof is given for 2n ≥ k.)
Lemma 5 (i) If (V2) is fulfilled, then |Lj−1| = |Lj | = )2γ˜* − 1 holds when cj ≥ 2 for
j = 2, . . . , !− 1.
(ii) If (V2) is fulfilled and ! ≥ 2, then |L0| = )γ˜* and |L1| ≥ )2γ˜* − 2 hold when c1 ≥ 2.
Symmetrically, we have |L!| = )γ˜* and |L!−1| ≥ )2γ˜* − 2 hold when c! > 2.
(iii) If (V2) and (V6) are fulfilled and ! ≥ 3, then c2 = 1 when c1 = 1. Symmetrically, we
have c!−1 = 1 when c! = 1.
Proof. (i) Consider a strategy profile satisfying (V2). Suppose that there exists j such
that cj ≥ 2 and |Lj | ≤ )2γ˜* − 2. Then, we have
u˜j ≤ δ()2γ˜* − 1)3 +
) $2γ˜%−12 *+ 1 + ) $2γ˜%−22 *
2
+
δ()2γ˜* − 2)
3
.
Since either )2γ˜* − 1 or )2γ˜* − 2 is odd, we obtain
u˜j ≤ 13 + γ˜ −
1
2
< γ˜,
which contradicts the minimality of γ˜.
(ii) Consider a strategy profile satisfying (V2). Suppose that c1 ≥ 2. If |L0| ≤ )γ˜*− 1,
then we have
u˜1 ≤ 12(|L0|+ 1 + )
|L1|
2
*) + δ(|L1|)
2 + c2
≤ 1
2
(|L0|+ 1 + |L1|− 12 ) +
1
3
≤ 1
2
()γ˜*+ )2γ˜* − 2
2
) +
1
3
≤ γ˜ − 1
2
+
1
3
< γ˜.
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If |L1| ≤ )2γ˜* − 3, then we have
u˜1 ≤ 12(|L0|+ 1 +
|L1|− 1
2
) +
1
3
≤ 1
2
()γ˜*+ 1 + )2γ˜* − 4
2
) +
1
3
≤ γ˜ − 1
2
+
1
3
< γ˜.
Both cases contradict the minimality of γ˜.
(iii) Consider a strategy profile satisfying (V2) and (V6). Suppose that c1 = 1 and
c2 ≥ 2. Since |L1| = 0 from (V6) and ! ≥ 3 from the assumption, we have
u˜2 ≤ 12(1 + )
|L2|
2
*) + δ(|L2|)
2 + c3
≤ 1
2
(1 +
|L2|− 1
2
) +
1
3
≤ 1
2
(1 +
)2γ˜* − 2
2
) +
1
3
≤ γ˜
2
+
1
3
.
Since γ˜ ≥ 1, we obtain u˜2 < γ˜, which contradicts the minimality of γ˜. !
Note that the assumption ! ≥ 3 in (iii) of Lemma 5 is needed because the strategy
profile θ = (2, 3) and c = (1, 2) on the path graph with 4 vertices will be a counterexample
without it.
We now exhibit pure Nash equilibrium strategy profiles for k players. It is trivial that
the strategy profile given by
θj = j and cj = 1, ∀j = 1, . . . , k (1)
on the path graph with k vertices is a pure Nash equilibrium. First, we provide construc-
tions of pure Nash equilibria for the path graph having an appropriate number of vertices
in the following several lemmas.
Lemma 6 Suppose that there are k players, where k ≥ 4. Let r be a positive integer
greater than or equal to 2, and bj a nonnegative integer less than or equal to 2r − 1 for
any j = 1, 2, . . . , )k−42 *. In addition, define b k−32 = 2r − 2 when k is odd. The strategy
profile given by
|Lj | =

r − 1 (j = 0, k)
0 (j = 1, k − 1)
2r − 2 (2 ≤ j ≤ k − 2, j : even)
b j−1
2
(3 ≤ j ≤ k − 2, j : odd),
(2)
and cj = 1 for j = 1, . . . , k is a pure Nash equilibrium for the discrete Voronoi game on
the path graph, if bj−1 < 2r − 1 and bj+1 < 2r − 1 hold for any j with bj = 0 (see Figure
4).
Proof. It is obvious that γ˜ = r. We can check that this strategy profile satisfies
(V1)–(V6). !
Lemma 6 implies that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium for k players on the path
graph with at least 2r'k2( − δ(k) and at most 2r'k2( + )k−42 *(2r − 1) − δ(k) vertices, for
any positive integer r(≥ 2).
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$% &r − 1$ '' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &b1 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &b2 $ ' $% $ '& $% &b k−42 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(a) k is even
$% &r − 1$ '' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &b1 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &b2 $ ' $% $ '& $% &b k−52 $ $'% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(b) k is odd
Figure 4: Strategy profiles derived from (2).
Lemma 7 Assume there are k players, where k ≥ 4, and p is an integer satisfying 2 ≤
p ≤ k − 2. For a positive integer r(≥ 2), the strategy profile given by
|Lj | =

r − 1 (j = 0, k)
0 (〈1 ≤ j ≤ k − 3, j : odd〉 ∨ j = k − 1)
2r − 3 (2 ≤ j ≤ p, j : even)
2r − 2 (otherwise)
(3)
with cj = 1 for j = 1, . . . , k is a pure Nash equilibrium for the discrete Voronoi game on
the path graph (see Figure 5).
$% &r − 1$ '' $% &2r − 3 $ '' $% &2r − 3 $ '' $% $ '& '$% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(a) k is even
$% &r − 1$ '' $% &2r − 3 $ '' $% &2r − 3 $ '' $% $ '& '$% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(b) k is odd
Figure 5: Strategy profiles derived from (3).
Proof. It is obvious that γ˜ = r − 12 . We can check that this strategy profile satisfies
(V1)–(V6). !
Lemma 7 implies that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium for k players on the path
graph with at least 2r'k2( − )k−22 * − δ(k) and at most 2r'k2( − 1 − δ(k) vertices, for any
positive integer r(≥ 2).
Lemma 8 (i) On the path graph having at least 3k+22 vertices, the discrete Voronoi game
with k players admits a pure Nash equilibrium, if k is even and greater than or equal to 6.
(ii) On the path graph having at least 3k+52 vertices, the discrete Voronoi game with k
players admits a pure Nash equilibrium, if k is odd and greater than or equal to 9.
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Proof. Let LB(k, r) = 2r'k2(−)k−22 *− δ(k) and UB(k, r) = 2r'k2(+ )k−42 *(2r− 1)− δ(k).
Lemmas 6 and 7 imply that a pure Nash equilibrium exists for every path whose number
of vertices lies in the interval [LB(k, r), UB(k, r)] for some positive integer r(≥ 2).
If k is even, LB(k, r) = rk − k−22 and UB(k, r) = rk + k−42 (2r − 1). When k ≥ 6,
then we have LB(k, r+1)−UB(k, r) = (1− r)k+4r− 1 ≤ 1. Thus, the strategy profiles
obtained from (2) and (3) give pure Nash equilibria for all the path graphs with at least
3k+2
2 vertices for even k(≥ 6) players.
If k is odd, LB(k, r) = r(k + 1)− k−12 and UB(k, r) = r(2k − 4)− k−32 . When k ≥ 9,
then we have LB(k, r + 1) − UB(k, r) = (1 − r)k + 5r ≤ 1. Thus, these strategy profiles
give pure Nash equilibria for all the path graphs with at least 3k+52 vertices for odd k(≥ 9)
players. !
When k = 2, every path graph has a pure Nash equilibrium such as
θ1 = 'n2 (, and c1 = 2,
where n is the number of vertices. When k = 4, for a positive integer r, the strategy
profile given by the pair
θ = (r, r + 1, n− r, n− r + 1) and c = (1, 1, 1, 1)
is a pure Nash equilibrium on the path graph with n = 4r or n = 4r − 1 vertices. The
strategy profile given by the pair
θ = (r, n− r + 1) and c = (2, 2)
is also a pure Nash equilibrium on the path graph with n = 4r − 2 or n = 4r − 3.
Moreover, when k is even, we can verify that, for the path graph with 3k2 vertices, the
strategy profile given by
θj = 3j − 1, and cj = 2, ∀j = 1, . . . , k2
is a pure Nash equilibrium (see (a) in Figure 6) , and for the path graph with 3k−42 vertices,
by
θ1 = 2, θj =
{
θj−1 + 1 (2 ≤ j ≤ k − 2, j : even)
θj−1 + 2 (3 ≤ j ≤ k − 3, j : odd),
c1 = ck−2 = 2, and c2 = c3 = · · · = ck−3 = 1
(4)
is a pure Nash equilibrium (see (b) in Figure 6). In addition, it is obvious that
θj = 2j and cj = 2, ∀j = 1, . . . , k2 (5)
is also pure Nash equilibrium on the path graph with k + 1 vertices (see (c) in Figure 6).
From these examples of strategy profiles, together with Lemma 8, we obtain the fol-
lowing Theorem.
Theorem 9 Suppose that k is even. If n = k, n = k + 1, n = 3k−42 or n ≥ 3k2 , then
the discrete Voronoi game with k players on the path graph with n vertices admits a pure
Nash equilibrium. !
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(a)
''' '' '' '''( ( ( ( ( () ) ) ) ) )
(b)
'' '' '' '' ''( ( ( ( ( ( () ) ) ) ) ) )
(c)
Figure 6: Pure Nash equilibria for discrete Voronoi games for even players.
We now turn to the case of odd players. Assume that k ≥ 5. For the path graph with
3k+3
2 vertices, we can verify that the strategy profile given by
θj = 3j − 1 ∀j = 1, . . . , k + 12 , and cj =
{
1 (j = 2)
2 (j $= 2)
is a pure Nash equilibrium (see (a) in Figure 7). For the path graph with 3k−12 vertices,
we can also confirm that the strategy profile given by
θ1 = 2, θj =
{
θj−1 + 1 (2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, j : even)
θj−1 + 2 (3 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, j : odd),
c1 = 2, and c2 = c3 = · · · = ck−1 = 1
(6)
is a pure Nash equilibrium (see (b) in Figure 7). Moreover, it is obvious that
θj =
{
2j (j = 1, . . . , k−12 )
k (j = k+12 )
and cj =
{
1 (j = k−12 )
2 (j $= k−12 )
(7)
on the path graph with k+1 vertices is also a pure Nash equilibrium (see (c) in Figure 7).
'' ' '' '' ''( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( () ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
(a)
''' '' '' ''( ( ( ( ( () ) ) ) ) )
(b)
'' '' '' '' '''( ( ( ( ( () ) ) ) ) )
(c)
Figure 7: Pure Nash equilibria for discrete Voronoi games for odd players.
For k = 7, a similar argument as the proof of Lemma 8 shows that LB(7, r + 1) −
UB(7, r) ≤ 1 holds for r ≥ 3. Since LB(7, 3) = 21 and UB(7, 2) = 18, we can construct
a pure Nash equilibrium from(2) and (3) on the path graph with at least 3k+52 vertices
except 19 and 20 vertices. For the path graphs with 19 and 20 vertices, the strategy
profiles given by
θ = (3, 4, 8, 11, 14, 17, 18) and c = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
and by
θ = (3, 4, 8, 11, 15, 18) and c = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2)
are pure Nash equilibria, respectively (see Figure 8).
The above discussion concludes the following theorem.
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'' ' ' ' ''( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( () ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
n = 19
'' ' ' ' ''( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( () ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
n = 20
Figure 8: Pure Nash equilibria for discrete Voronoi games with 7 players on the path with
19 and 20 vertices.
Theorem 10 Suppose that k is odd and k ≥ 7. If n = k, n = k + 1, n = 3k−12 or
n ≥ 3k+32 , then the discrete Voronoi game with k players on the path graph with n vertices
admits a pure Nash equilibrium. !
Now, we address to the cases of k = 3 and k = 5, which are not mentioned in Theo-
rem 10.
Lemma 11 The discrete Voronoi game with 3 players on the path graph with n vertices
possesses a pure Nash equilibrium, if and only if n ≤ 4.
Proof. Since we know that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium for n ≤ 3, consider the
case of n ≥ 4. If there exists a pure Nash equilibrium with c1 = c2 = c3 = 1, then (V6)
derives |L1| = |L2| = 0, which implies that |L0| = ) |L2|+12 * = 0 and |L3| = ) |L1|+12 * = 0.
Thus, it is possible only when n = k. If a pure Nash equilibrium with c1 = 1 and c2 = 2
exists, we have u˜2 =
|L2|+1
2 since |L1| = 0. A utility of a player on θ2 becomes |L2|, if
he/she moves to θ2 + 1. Because this utility is not greater than u˜2, we have |L2| ≤ 1.
Hence, we obtain |L0| ≤ 1 and n ≤ 4. !
Lemma 12 The discrete Voronoi game with 5 players on the path with n vertices possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium, if and only if n $≡ 2( mod 6).
Proof. We enumerate all strategy profiles satisfying (V1)–(V6).
First, we consider pure Nash equilibria with cj = 1 for j = 1, . . . , 5. It follows from
(V6) that |L1| = |L4| = 0. If |L0| = |L5| = r − 1, then (V6) implies that each of |L2| and
|L3| is either 2r− 2 or 2r− 3. These strategy profiles satisfy (V1)–(V6). Thus, these give
pure Nash equilibria on the path graphs with 6r − 1, 6r − 2 and 6r − 3, respectively (see
(a), (b) and (c) in Figure 9). If |L0| > |L5| = r − 1, then |L0| = r and |L2| = 2r − 1 from
(V2) and (V6), since γ˜ ≤ u˜5 = r. If |L3| ≤ 2r− 3, then the utility u˜4 is less than r, which
contradicts |L0| = r ≤ )γ˜* ≤ u˜4. Thus, |L3| = 2r − 2. In this case, (V5) is not satisfied
since γ˜ = r.
Next, we discuss the case where cj = 2 for some j. From the condition (iii) in Lemma 5,
such j is only either 1 or !. When c1 = c3 = 2 and c2 = 1, the condition (ii) in Lemma 5
implies that |L0| = |L3| = )γ˜*. Suppose that |L0| = |L3| = r. Since 2r ≤ )2γ˜* ≤ 2r + 1,
each of |L1| and |L2| is either 2r, 2r − 1 or 2r − 2. Without loss of generality, we assume
that |L1| ≤ |L2|. When |L2| = 2r, then it follows from (V2) that γ˜ ≥ r + 12 . Thus, to
satisfy u˜1 ≥ r+ 12 , we have |L1| = 2r. This strategy profile gives a pure Nash equilibrium
on the path with 6r + 3 vertices (see (d) in Figure 9). When |L2| = 2r − 1, then it
violates (V3) if |L1| = |L2| = 2r − 1. Thus, we have |L1| = 2r − 2. The rest possibility
is |L1| = |L2| = 2r − 2. These also satisfy (V1)–(V6) and give pure Nash equilibria on
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path graphs with 6r and 6r − 1 vertices (see (e) and (f) in Figure 9). Finally, we treat
pure Nash equilibria with c1 = 2 and c2 = c3 = c4 = 1, in which |L3| = 0. Suppose that
|L0| = r = )γ˜*. The condition (ii) in Lemma 5, (V2) and (V3) imply that |L1| is either
2r − 2 or 2r. Moreover, |L2| ≥ 2r − 2 and |L4| ≥ r − 1 hold, since γ˜ ≥ r. If |L4| = r − 1,
then |L2| = 2r − 2 from (V6). In addition, |L1| = 2r − 2 from (V2) since γ˜ ≤ r. This
strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium on the path graph with 6r − 1 vertices (see
(g) in Figure 9). If |L4| = r, then |L2| = 2r − 1 or 2r from (V6). In this case, there are
three possible strategy profiles shown in (h) (i) and (j) in Figure 9. If |L1| = 2r − 2, then
u˜1 = r ≥ γ˜, which implies that |L2| ≤ 2r − 1 from (V2). If |L1| = 2r, then |L2| can be
2r − 1 or 2r. These strategy profiles are also pure Nash equilibria on path graphs with
6r + 1, 6r + 3 and 6r + 4, respectively.
We complete the enumeration of all possibility, and obtain pure Nash equilibria on the
path graphs with 6r, 6r + 1, 6r + 3, 6r + 4, and 6r + 5, respectively. !
$% &r − 1$ '' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(a): γ˜ = r
$% &r − 1$ '' $% &2r − 3 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(b): γ˜ = r − 12
$% &r − 1$ '' $% &2r − 3 $ ' $% &2r − 3 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(c): γ˜ = r − 12
$% &r $ '' $% &2r $ ' $% &2r $ '' $% &r $
(d): γ˜ = r + 12
$% &r $ '' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &2r − 1 $ '' $% &r $
(e): γ˜ = r
$% &r $ '' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r $
(f): γ˜ = r
$% &r $ '' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &2r − 2 $ '' $% &r − 1$
(g): γ˜ = r
$% &r $ '' $% &2r − 2 $ ' $% &2r − 1 $ '' $% &r $
(h): γ˜ = r
$% &r $ '' $% &2r $ ' $% &2r − 1 $ '' $% &r $
(i): γ˜ = r + 12
$% &r $ '' $% &2r $ ' $% &2r $ '' $% &r $
(j): γ˜ = r + 12
Figure 9: All pure Nash equilibria for the discrete Voronoi game with 5 players on the
path graphs.
Lemmas 11 and 12 are necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure
Nash equilibria in path graphs for 3 and 5 players. On the other hand, Theorems 9 and 10
only claim the conditions in the statements are necessary for the existence of pure Nash
equilibria in the path graphs except k = 3, 5. We show these conditions are also sufficient
in the following theorem.
Theorem 13 (i) If k is even, the discrete Voronoi game with k players on the path graph
with n vertices does not admit pure Nash equilibria for k + 2 ≤ n ≤ 3k−62 or n = 3k−22 .
(ii) If k is odd with k ≥ 7, the discrete Voronoi game with k players on the path graph
with n vertices does not admit pure Nash equilibria for k + 2 ≤ n ≤ 3k−32 or n = 3k+12 .
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Proof. We first consider Nash equilibria with 1 ≤ γ˜ < 32 . Since )γ˜* = 1 and )2γ˜* = 2,
(V2) derives |Lj | ≤ 1 for all j = 0, . . . , !.
When cj = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , !, we have |L1| = |L!−1| = 0 from (V6). If |L0| = 0,
then (V6) implies that |L2| = 0. By applying (V5) inductively, we have |Lj | = 0 for all
j = 3, . . . , !, which coincides with the strategy profile by (1). If |L0| = 1, then (V6) implies
that |L2| = 1. By applying (V4) and (V5) inductively, we have
|Li| =
{
1 (j : even)
0 (j : odd).
However, we obtain γ˜ = 32 in this strategy profile. Thus, the assumption is not satisfied.
When there exists some j with 2 ≤ j ≤ ! − 1 such that cj = 2, the condition (i) in
Lemma 5 implies that |Lj−1| = |Lj | = 1. In order to satisfy (V3), cj = 2 for all j except
j = 1, !− 1. Thus, admitted strategy profiles are given by (5), (7), or
θ1 = 2, θj =
{
θj−1 + 2 (j $= 2, !)
θj−1 + 1 (j = 2, !)
and cj =
{
2 (j $= 2, !− 1)
1 (j = 2, !− 1)
on the path graph with k + 1 vertices. When c1 = 2 and c2 = · · · = c!−1 = 1, we have
|L0| = 1 and |L1| = 0 from the condition (ii) in Lemma 5 and (V3). If |L2| = 0, by
applying (V5) inductively, we have |L3| = |L4| = · · · = |L!−1| = 0. In this case, if c! = 1,
then |L!| = )2|L!−2|+12 * = 0 from (V6). And if c! = 2, then |L!| = 1 from the condition (ii)
in Lemma 5. Thus, we obtain n = k irrespective of c!. If |L2| = 1, by applying (V4) and
(V5) inductively, we have
|Li| =
{
1 (j : even)
0 (j : odd)
Such a strategy profile is obtained from (4) or (6). Here (4) implies k is even and n = 3k−42 ,
and (6) implies k is odd and n = 3k−12 .
The discussion above covers the cases with n < 3k2 , since we have γ˜ ≤ nk < 32 . Thus,
what remains is the case that k(≥ 7) is odd and n = 3k+12 . Suppose that there exists a
pure Nash equilibrium. Let k be the smallest number of players such that a pure Nash
equilibrium exists on the path graph with 3k+12 vertices. From Lemmas 11 and 12, we
know k ≥ 7. Because of the former discussion in this proof, we have γ˜ ≥ 32 , which implies
that 32 ≤ u˜j ≤ 2 for all j = 1, . . . , !. Moreover, if u˜j = 2 for some j, then the rest of
utilities u˜j′ with j′ $= j is equal to 32 . If c1 = 1, then |L1| = 0 and u˜1 = |L0| + 1. In this
case, we have u˜1 = 2. In addition, (iii) in Lemma 5 implies that c2 = 1. Since u˜2 = 32 ,
we have |L2| = 1 and c3 = 1. By the same way, |L3| = 0 holds. Since γ˜ = 32 , we have
|L4| ≤ 2 from (V2). Thus, we obtain c4 = 1, because if not, u˜4 ≤ 12(1 + |L4|2 ) < 32 . Hence,
if we remove vertices between θ2 and θ3, that is, {3, 4, 5}, from this path graph, then the
resulting strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for (k− 2) players on the path graph with
3k+1
2 −3 = 3(k−2)+12 . If c1 = 2, then |L0| = 1 from the condition (ii) in Lemma 5. Moreover|L1| = 2 since u˜1 ≥ 32 . When c2 = 2, then |L2| = 2 is obtain by the same way. When
c2 = 1, then |L2| = 0 since u˜2 ≤ 2. Hence, if we remove vertices {1, 2, 3} from this path
graph, then the resulting strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for (k − 2) players on a
path with 3(k−2)+12 . In both cases, we have a contradiction for the minimality of k. !
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We summarize the existence of pure Nash equilibria for the discrete Voronoi games
with k players in Table 1. Particularly, Table 2 shows for small k and n. In these tables,
“"” and “-” mean that existence and nonexistence of pure Nash equilibria, respectively.
It is interesting that the games on path graphs are more complicated than on cycle graphs.
Table 1: The existence of a pure Nash equilibria for the discrete Voronoi games.
n k k + 1 k + 2 ≤ · · · ≤ # 3k2 $ − 3 # 3k2 $ − 2 # 3k2 $ − 1 # 3k2 $ # 3k2 $+ 1 ≤ · · ·
cycle [3, 7] " - - - - " "
path (k: even) " " - " - " "
(k ≥ 7, odd) " " - - " - "
Table 2: The existence of a pure Nash equilibria for discrete the Voronoi games on a path
graph for small k and n.
/////k
n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 · · ·
2 " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
3 " " - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
5 " " " - " " " " " - " " "
6 " " - " " " " " " " " "
7 " " - " - " " " " " "
8 " " " - " " " " " "
9 " " - - " - " " "
10 " " - " - " " "
Remark 1 The strategy profiles given by (2) and (3) are pure Nash equilibria on cycle
graphs by adding an edge (1, n) to the path graph. Mavronicolas et al. [7] have shown
pure Nash equilibria on cycle graphs by only standard strategy profiles in which |Li| is
given by ) kn−k* or ' kn−k(. On the other hand, our strategy profiles are not standard. Thus,
our examples demonstrate variety of pure Nash equilibria.
Remark 2 We call a strategy profile simple if cj = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , !. As discussed
in the next section, pure Nash equilibria are necessarily simple for information diffusion
games. On the other hand, in discrete Voronoi games pure Nash equilibria can be nonsim-
ple. This difference is one of the causes of the different behavior of pure Nash equilibria
between discrete Voronoi games and information diffusion games. When k = 2 and n is
odd, the unique pure Nash equilibrium is given by a nonsimple strategy profile. Also,
when k = 4 and n ≡ 2( mod 4) or ≡ 3( mod 4), there are no simple strategy profile
giving pure Nash equilibria.
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4.2 Information diffusion game
In the path graph, the analysis of pure Nash equilibria of information diffusion games is
simpler than that of discrete Voronoi games. In information diffusion games, the utility
of the player who chooses the vertex θj becomes zero if cj ≥ 2. Hence, we only need to
consider strategy profiles with cj = 1 for all j, namely, simple strategy profiles. Thus, we
express the strategy profiles only by θ instead of (θ, c). Note that the number of vertices
chosen by the players in a simple strategy profile equals the number of the players, that
is, ! = k. The utility of the player who chooses the vertex θj is given by
uj(θ) =

|L0|+ ) |L1|2 *+ 1 (j = 1)
) |Lj−1|2 *+ ) |Lj |2 *+ 1 (1 < j < k)
) |Lk−1|2 *+ |Lk|+ 1 (j = k).
For short, we write uj instead of uj(θ).
The following theorem characterizes the existence of pure Nash equilibria for the in-
formation diffusion game on a path graph.
Theorem 14 For the information diffusion game with k players on the path graph with
n(≥ k) vertices, a strategy profile defined by θ is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if
the following hold:
(I1) |Lj | ≤ 2γ for all j = 1, . . . , k − 1, |L0| ≤ γ and |Lk| ≤ γ.
(I2) Both of |Lj−1| and |Lj | are not simultaneously odd. Namely, δ(|Lj−1|) + δ(|Lj |) ≤ 1
for j = 2, . . . , k − 1.
(I3) |L1| = 0 and |Lk−1| = 0.
Here, γ = min{uj | j = 1, . . . , k} is the minimum utility.
Proof. For j = 2, . . . , k − 1, the player on θj cannot improve his utility by moving to any
vertex in Lj−1∪Lj if and only if (I2) is satisfied. The players on θ1 and θk cannot improve
their utility by moving to neighboring vertices, if and only if (I3) is satisfied. The player
on θj cannot improve his/her utility by moving to any vertex in Li with i $= j − 1 and
i $= j, if and only if (I1) satisfied. !
Lemma 15 On the path graph having more than six vertices, the information diffusion
game with three players does not possess a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It follows from (I3) that a pure Nash equilibrium satisfies θ2 = θ1+1 and θ3 = θ2+1.
Thus, we have γ = u2 = 1, which implies that |L0| and |L3| is at most 1. Hence, if a
strategy profile satisfies (I1)–(I3), then the number of vertices is at most 5. !
We now exhibit pure Nash equilibria for each k. When k = 2, the only equilibrium is
given by the paired location in center, similar to Hotelling’s location games and discrete
Voronoi games. Namely, (θ1, θ2) given by either ()n2 *, )n2 * + 1) or ('n2 (, 'n2 ( + 1) is the
desired location. When k = 4, we can verify that strategy profiles (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) given by
()n4 *, )n4 * + 1, )3n4 *, )3n4 * + 1) and ('n4 (, 'n4 ( + 1, '3n4 (, '3n4 ( + 1) are pure Nash equilibria.
Further, Figure 10 shows all Nash equilibria for information diffusion games with four
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Figure 10: All Nash equilibria for the information diffusion game with four players on the
path graph.
players, provided that |L0| ≤ |L4|. All these strategy profiles satisfy γ = r. When k = 5,
unlike the case of the discrete Voronoi games, we can obtain pure Nash equilibria shown
in Figure 11, where r is a nonnegative integer. These strategy profiles also provide γ = r,
and it is easy to verify these satisfy (I1)–(I3).
Theorem 16 The information diffusion game on the path graph possesses a pure Nash
equilibrium when the number of player is not three.
Proof. Strategy profiles θ given by (2) and (3), respectively, satisfy (I1)–(I3). Thus, these
are pure Nash equilibria for both of discrete Voronoi games and information diffusion
games, and the similar arguments of Lemma 8 also hold for the information diffusion
games. Together with the case of k = 2 and 4 described in the above of this Theorem,
we have pure Nash equilibria on the path graph whose number of vertices is more than
or equal to 3k+22 for even k. For odd k, we showed pure Nash equilibria for k = 5. When
k = 7, a similar argument as the proof of Lemma 8 provides a pure Nash equilibrium from
(2) and (3) on the path graph with at least 3k+52 vertices except 19 and 20 vertices. In
addition, a strategy profile
θ = (3, 4, 8, 11, 14, 17, 18) (8)
is a pure Nash equilibrium on the path graph with both base of 19 vertices and 20 vertices.
Thus, for any k except 3, we obtain pure Nash equilibria for the information diffusion games
on a path graph whose number of vertices is more than or equal to 3k+22 for even k and
3k+5
2 for odd k.
Moreover, a strategy profile θ′ given by
|Lj | =
{
1 (j : even, 0 ≤ j ≤ p)
0 (otherwise) (9)
satisfies (I1)–(I3), for any p less than k− 1. Additionally, a strategy profile obtained from
θ′ by replacing |Lk| = 1 instead of |Lk| = 0 is still a pure Nash equilibrium. Thus, on the
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Figure 11: Pure Nash equilibria for the information diffusion game with five players on
the path graph.
path graphs having less than )3k+32 * vertices, the information diffusion games have pure
Nash equilibria.
Therefore, we conclude the existence of pure Nash equilibria for any case except k = 3.
!
Remark 3 By a similar way, we can give a characterization for the existence of pure Nash
equilibria on cycle graphs. A strategy profile θ is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if
(I1)’ |Lj | ≤ 2γ for all j
(I2)’ both of |Lj−1| and |Lj | are not simultaneously odd, for all j. Here, identify L0 with
Lk.
Therefore, on a cycle graph by adding an edge (0, n) to the path graph, the strategy
profiles discussed in the proof of Theorem 16, that is to say, given by (2), (3), (8) and
(9), satisfy (I1)’ and (I2)’. Hence, these show that the information diffusion games on the
cycle graphs have pure Nash equilibria for any number of players except three. On the
other hand, for the games with three players on the cycle graphs, consider the strategy
profiles as follows: θ = (1, 'n2 (, n) if 'n2 ( is even, and θ = (1, )n2 *, n) otherwise. These
satisfy (I1)’ and (I2)’, and thus we see that the game on the cycle graphs has always pure
Nash equilibria also for the case the number of players is three. (For the case the number
of players is three, Ito and Muramatsu [6] have previously shown a partial result.)
5 Discussion
In the previous section, we gave the complete characterization for existence of pure Nash
equilibria for both of the discrete Voronoi games and the information diffusion games on
the path graphs and the cycle graphs. On tree graphs, Ito and Muramatsu [6] and Small
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Figure 12: (5, 3)-spider graph
and Mason [8] discussed the existence of pure Nash equilibria for the information diffusion
games. For a tree graph, Small and Mason showed that a pure Nash equilibrium strategy
profile is given by a pair of adjacent vertices x∗ = (v, w) such that |U1(v, w) − U2(v, w)|
is minimized. Note that this strategy profile x∗ is also a pure Nash equilibrium for the
discrete Voronoi game if U1(v, w) = U2(v, w). If U1(v, w) $= U2(v, w), without loss of
generality, assume that U1(v, w) > U2(v, w). Then, a strategy profile where the both
players choose v is a pure Nash equilibrium for the discrete Voronoi game.
We now show, for at least three players, there exists a tree on which any pure Nash
equilibrium is not admitted. Our Lemmas 11 and 15 describe for three players on the path
graphs, a special case of tree graphs. We generalize these results to spider graphs. We call
a graph (s, t)-spider if it is obtained from the star K1,s by subdividing each edge by t− 1
new vertices. Note that the (s, t)-spider graph has st+ 1 vertices. Let v0 be the vertex in
the center, and we name other vertices as vi1, vi2, . . . , vit along each i-th paths (i = 1, . . . , s)
from the vertex next to the center to the leaf. (See Figure 12.)
Lemma 17 On the (k − 1, t)-spider graph for any k ≥ 3 and t ≥ 3, neither the discrete
Voronoi game nor the information diffusion game with k players possess a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. First, we observe two claims.
claim 1: If there exists i such that no vertices of {vij | j = 1, . . . , t} are chosen by any
players, then such a strategy profile is not a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof of claim 1. Since players share the number of vertices as their utility, there exists a
player whose utility is at most t(k−1)+1k < t. If this player relocates into v
i
1, then his/her
utility increases to t. !
The properties in the next claim can be shown by arguments similar to our previous
discussion around the conditions (V6) and (I3). For convenience, we represent v0 as vi0 for
each i.
Proof of claim 2. (1) In a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile for the discrete
Voronoi game, if a player locates on a vertex vij (1 ≤ j ≤ t) and no player locates on vij′
for any j′ > j, then there exists another player located on the same vertex vij or on the
adjacent vertex vij−1.
(2) In a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile for the information diffusion game, if a
player locates on a vertex vij (1 ≤ j ≤ t) and no player locates on vij′ for any j′ > j, then
there exists another player locating on the adjacent vertex vij−1.
20
By these claims, the only possible strategy profile for a candidate of a pure Nash
equilibrium is (v0, v11, v21, . . . , v
k−1
1 ). However, the player locating on v0 can increase his/her
utility by moving into vi2 for some i. Thus, this strategy profile is not a pure Nash
equilibrium. !
Theorem 18 For at least 3 players, there exist trees on which any pure Nash equilibria
for neither the discrete Voronoi game nor the information diffusion game are admitted.
The characterization of the existence of pure Nash equilibria for both games in more
general graph classes will be an interesting open problem for future works.
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Appendix: proof for Theorem 4
Our proof for Theorem 4 is analogous to Mavronicolas et al. [7]. Particularly, we employ
their arguments for the middle vertices of the paths. On the other hand, for the ends of
the paths we need careful treatments. We provide here the full proof, though it includes
similar discussions as [7]. As is remarked after Theorem 4, in this appendix we assume
2n ≥ k.
We first prove that (V1)–(V6) are necessity conditions.
Lemma 19 If a strategy profile does not satisfy (V1), then there exists a player whose
utility is improved by relocation.
Proof. Assume that cj ≥ 3, where j $= 1 nor !. If θj−1 = θj − 1 and θj+1 = θj + 1 hold,
then we have u˜j = 1cj ≤ 13 , since |Lj−1| = |Lj | = 0. By relocating a player on θj to a vertex
that is chosen by at most one player, his/her utility increases to at least 12 . (Remark that
such a vertex exists by the assumption 2n ≥ k.) If either θj−1 < θj − 1 or θj+1 > θj + 1
holds, without loss of generality, we assume that |Lj−1| ≤ |Lj |. Then, we have
u˜j ≤ 2)
|Lj |
2 *+ 1
cj
+ 2
δ(|Lj |)
cj + 1
≤ 2)
|Lj |
2 *+ 1
3
+
δ(|Lj |)
2
.
When a player on θj relocates to θj + 1, then his/her utility u˜′ becomes
u˜′ = ) |Lj |− 1
2
*+ 1 + 1− δ(|Lj |)
1 + cj+1
. (10)
If δ(|Lj |) = 0 holds, then we obtain u˜j ≤ |Lj |3 + 13 and u˜′ > |Lj |2 . It follows from |Lj | ≥ 2
that u˜j < u˜′ holds. If δ(|Lj |) = 1 holds, then we obtain u˜j ≤ |Lj |3 + 12 < |Lj |2 + 12 = u˜′.
Therefor, a player on θj can improve his/her utility by moving onto θj + 1.
We next consider the case of c1 ≥ 3. If ! = 1, then all players choose θ1 and obtain
u˜1 ≤ n3 . Since max{|L0|, |L1|} ≥ n−12 > n3 holds under n ≥ 4, any player increases his/her
utility by relocating to an appropriate neighbor vertex. Thus, we assume that ! > 1. It
is easy to see as before that a player on θ1 can improve his/her utility if |L0| = |L1| = 0.
We assume at least one of |L0| > 0 or |L1| > 0 holds. In this case, we have
u˜1 ≤ |L0|+ 1 + )
|L1|
2 *
3
+
δ(|L1|)
4
.
If |L0| ≤ ) |L1|2 * holds, then we obtain u˜1 ≤
2$ |L1|2 %+1
3 +
δ(|L1|)
4 ≤ |L1|+13 . By relocating a
player on θ1 to θ1 + 1, his/her utility increases to more than
|L1|
2 , which is derived from
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(10). Thus, we have u˜1 < u˜′. If |L0| > ) |L1|2 *, that is equivalent to |L0| ≥ |L1|2 + 12 , holds,
we obtain u˜1 ≤ |L0|+1+
|L1|−1
2
3 +
1
4 ≤ 2|L0|3 + 14 . Thus, u˜1 is less than |L0| which is the utility
obtained by relocating a player on θ1 to θ1 − 1. Thus, in both cases, a player on θ1 can
improve his/her utility by moving onto an appropriate neighbor vertex.
The case of c! ≥ 3 is also shown by the similar argument as the case of c1 ≥ 3. !
Lemma 20 If a strategy profile fulfills (V1) but does not satisfy (V2) , then there exists
a player whose utility is improved by relocation.
Proof. If |L0| ≥ )γ˜* + 1 (resp. |L!| ≥ )γ˜* + 1), then a player whose utility is γ˜ relocates
to θ1 − 1 (resp. θ! + 1) in order to increase his/her utility, where the new utility is given
by |L0|(resp. |L!|) > γ˜.
We next assume that |Lj | ≥ )2γ˜*. If a player relocates to θj+1 − 1, the his/her new
utility u˜′ becomes
u˜′ = 1 + ) |Lj |− 1
2
*+ δ(|Lj |− 1)
1 + cj
.
If any one of (i) δ(|Lj |− 1) = 0, (ii) cj = 1 and (iii) )2γ˜* = 2γ˜ is satisfied, we have u˜′ > γ˜.
Thus, a player whose utility is γ˜ can increase his/her utility by moving onto θj+1− 1. So,
we consider any j with |Lj | ≥ )2γ˜* does not satisfy any of the cases (i), (ii) or (iii). For
such a j, if j ≥ 2 and |Lj | > |Lj−1|, then we have u˜j < |Lj |+12 . By relocating a player on
θj to θj+1 − 1, his/her utility becomes |Lj |+12 . The case of |Lj | < |Lj−1| also has a player
whose utility can be improved, since |Lj−1| > )2γ˜*. Similarly, assume that |L1| ≥ )2γ˜*
and |L1| > 2|L0|. Then, we have u˜1 < |L1|+12 and the new utility after relocating to θ2− 1
is |Lj |+12 . When |L1| < 2|L0|, we have |L0| ≥ $2γ˜%+12 > )γ˜*, which we discussed in the first
part of this proof. We can give a similar argument when |L!−1| ≥ )2γ˜*.
The remaining case is |Lj | = p for all j = 1, . . . , ! − 1, 2|L0| = 2|L!| = p, where
p ≥ )2γ˜*, δ(p) = 0, and cj = 2 for all j. In this case, we have u˜j = p+12 ≥ $2γ˜%+12 > γ˜ for
all j, which contradicts to the definition of γ˜.
Lemma 21 If a strategy profile fulfills (V2) but does not satisfy (V3), then there exists a
player whose utility is improved by relocation.
Proof. Suppose that cj = 1, cj+1 ≥ 2 and |Lj | is odd. When j = 1, the player on θ1 can
increase his/her utility by relocating to θ1 + 1, since |L1| ≥ 1. When j $= 1, we have
u˜j ≤ δ(|Lj−1|)1 + cj−1 + )
|Lj−1|
2
*+ 1 + |Lj |− 1
2
+
1
3
.
By relocating the player on θj to θj + 1, his/her utility u˜′ becomes
u˜′ =
δ(|Lj−1|+ 1)
1 + cj−1
+ ) |Lj−1|+ 1
2
*+ 1 + |Lj |− 1
2
.
If δ(|Lj−1|) = 1 holds, then we obtain u˜j ≤ 11+cj−1 +
|Lj−1|+|Lj |
2 +
1
3 <
|Lj−1|+|Lj |
2 + 1 = u˜
′.
If δ(|Lj−1|) = 0 holds, then we obtain u˜j ≤ |Lj−1|+|Lj |2 + 56 and u˜′ = 11+cj−1 +
|Lj−1|+|Lj |
2 +
1
2 .
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Thus, u˜j < u˜′ holds under cj−1 = 1. If cj−1 ≥ 2 and j − 1 ≥ 2, then the condition (i) of
Lemma 5 implies that |Lj−1| = )2γ˜* − 1 = |Lj |. Thus, δ(|Lj−1|) = δ(|Lj |) = 1, since Lj
is odd by assumption. The remaining case under δ(|Lj−1|) = 0 is j = 2 and c1 ≥ 2, that
is, the case c1 ≥ 2, c2 = 1, and, c3 ≥ 2. However, this is the condition of the exceptional
case in (V3).
Finally, we check the statement for the case of c1 ≥ 2, c2 = 1 and c3 ≥ 2 (The case of
c! ≥ 2, c!−1 = 1 and c!−2 ≥ 2 is symmetric). If both of |L1| and |L2| are odd, then we
obtain u˜2 ≤ 23 + |Lj−1|+|Lj |2 < |Lj−1|+|Lj |2 + 1 = u˜′, where u˜′ is the utility obtained by the
player on θ2 relocating to θ2 + 1. !
Lemma 22 If a strategy profile fulfills (V3) but does not satisfy (V4), then there exists a
player whose utility is improved by relocation.
Proof. Assume that cj = 1, |Lj−1| = |Lj | = 2γ˜ − 1 and 2γ˜ is even. From (V3), we have
cj−1 = cj+1 = 1. By relocating to θj , a player whose utility is γ˜ increases his/her utility
to at least
1
3
+
|Lj−1|−1
2 + 1 +
|Lj |−1
2
2
+
1
3
=
2γ˜ − 1
2
+
2
3
> γ˜.
!
Lemma 23 If a strategy profile fulfills (V1) and (V3), but does not satisfy (V5), then
there exists a player whose utility is improved by relocation.
Proof. Assume that cj = cj+1 = 1 and |Lj−1| + |Lj | + 1 = |Lj+1| = 2γ˜ − 1 hold whereas
2γ˜ is even. From (V3), we obtain cj+2 = 1. If the player on θj relocates to θj+1, then
his/her utility becomes
1
2 + cj−1
+
1
2
(
(|Lj−1|+ |Lj |+ 1)− 1
2
+ 1 +
|Lj+1|− 1
2
) +
1
3
≥ 1
4
+
1
2
(2γ˜ − 1) + 1
3
> γ˜,
while u˜j ≤ |Lj−1|2 + 1 + |Lj |2 ≤ 2γ˜−12 + 12 = γ˜. Hence, the player on θj can improve his/her
utility.
The second implication can be shown in a similar way. !
Lemma 24 If a strategy profile fulfills (V2) but does not satisfy (V6), then there exists a
player whose utility is improved by relocation.
Proof. We only show the condition for c1 = 1, as the the argument for the condition for
c! = 1 is just symmetric.
If γ˜ < 1, then |Lj | = 0 for all 0 ≤ 0 ≤ ! and (V6) trivially holds. Hence we have
γ˜ ≥ 1 in order that (V6) is not satisfied. It is obvious that the player on θ1 can increase
his/her utility by relocating to θ1+1 if |L1| ≥ 1. Thus, we assume that |L1| = 0. We also
assume that ! ≥ 3. Then, the condition (i) of Lemma 5 implies that c2 = 1, since γ˜ ≥ 1
and )2γ˜* − 1 ≥ 1. When |L0| ≤ |L2|−12 , by relocating to θ2, the utility of the player on θ1
becomes
(|L0|+ 1) + 1 + ) |L2|2 *
2
+
δ(|L2|)
2 + c3
>
|L0|+ 2 + |L2|−12
2
≥ |L0|+ 1,
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which is greater than the original utility u˜1 = |L0|+1. When |L0| ≥ |L2|2 +1, by relocating
θ1, the utility of the player on θ2 becomes
|L0|+ 1 + ) |L2|+12 *
2
+
δ(|L2|+ 1)
2 + c3
>
|L0|+ 1 + |L2|2
2
≥ |L2|
2
+ 1,
which is greater than the original utility u˜2 = ) |L2|2 *+ 1 + δ(|L2|)1+c3 ≤
|L2|
2 + 1. !
To prove that (V1)–(V6) give a sufficient condition, we consider the following four
cases of relocating a player in a strategy profile (θ, c), as like Claim 1 in [7].
(C1) A player on θj with cj = 1 moves to a vertex in Lj−1 ∪ Lj .
(C2) A player on θj moves to a vertex in Li for the cases not covered by (C1).
(C3) A player on θj with cj = 1 moves to θj−1 or θj+1.
(C4) A player on θj moves to θi for the cases not covered by (C3).
Note that a strategy profile (θ, c) is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if neither case
improves the utility of a player by relocation.
Lemma 25 The utility of the player is not improved by the relocation of (C1), if the
strategy profile fulfills (V3) and (V6).
Proof. When j = 1, the player can move to only L0, since |L1| = 0 form (V6). It is
obvious that his/her utility is not increased by moving into L0. The case of j = ! is the
same. When j $= 1, !, without loss of generality, assume that the player moves to θj + a
for 0 < a ≤ |Lj |. The utility after moving is given by
u˜′ =
δ(|Lj−1|+ a)
1 + cj−1
+ ) |Lj−1|+ a
2
*+ 1 + ) |Lj |− a
2
*+ δ(|Lj |− a)
1 + cj+1
.
If a is even, then we have u˜j = u˜′, since ) |Lj−1|−a2 * + δ(|Lj |−a)1+cj+1 = )
|Lj−1|
2 * + δ(|Lj |)1+cj+1 − a2 .
Otherwise, namely when a is odd, then we have ) |Lj |−a2 *+ δ(|Lj |−a)1+cj+1 > )
|Lj |
2 *+ δ(|Lj |)1+cj+1 − a2
if and only if cj+1 ≥ 2 and |Lj | is odd. Almost such cases are forbidden by (V3). The
remaining case is c1 = 2, c2 = 1, c3 = 2 and either |L1| or |L2| is even (reps. c!−2 = 2,
c!−1 = 1, c! = 2 and either |L!−2| or |L!−1| is even). For this case, we also have u˜′ = u˜j
for any a. !
Lemma 26 The utility of the player is not improved by the relocation of (C2), if the
strategy profile fulfills (V2).
Proof. We denote by u˜′ the utility of a player who moves to a vertex on Li. If i = 0 (reps.
i = !), then u˜′ ≤ |L0| (resp. |L!|) ≤ )γ˜* ≤ γ˜. Otherwise, we have u˜′ ≤ |Li|−12 + 1 ≤ $2γ˜%2 ≤
γ˜. Thus, the player can not increase his/her utility. !
Lemma 27 The utility of the player is not improved by the relocation of (C3), if the
strategy profile fulfills (V1), (V2), (V5) and (V6).
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the player on θj moves to θj+1. The
utility which the player obtains by moving is denoted by u˜′.
We first consider the case of j = 1. Since |L0| = ) |L2|2 *+ δ(|L2|) from (V6), we obtain
u˜′ ≤ |L0|+ 2 + )
|L2|
2 *
2
+
δ(|L2|)
2 + c3
≤ |L0|+ 1− δ(|L2|)6 ,
while u˜1 = |L0|+ 1.
We next consider the case of j $= 1 nor ! − 1. Since γ˜ ≤ u˜j ≤ |Lj−1|+|Lj |2 + 1, we
have |Lj−1| + |Lj | + 1 ≥ 2γ˜ − 1. If |Lj−1| + |Lj | + 1 > 2γ˜ − 1 or |Lj+1| < 2γ˜ − 1, then
|Lj−1|+ |Lj | ≥ |Lj+1| holds. Thus, we have
u˜′ ≤ δ(|Lj−1|+ |Lj |+ 1)
2 + cj+1
+
) |Lj−1|+|Lj |+12 *+ 1 + ) |Lj+1|2 *
1 + cj+1
+
δ(|Lj+1|)
2 + cj+1
≤ δ(|Lj−1|+ |Lj |+ 1)
2 + cj+1
+
) |Lj−1|+|Lj |+12 *+ 1 + ) |Lj+1|+|Lj |2 *
1 + cj+1
+
δ(|Lj−1|+ |Lj |)
2 + cj+1
=
1
2 + cj+1
+
|Lj−1|+ |Lj |+ 1
1 + cj+1
≤ 1
3
+
|Lj−1|+ |Lj |
2
+
1
1 + cj+1
≤ u˜j .
If |Lj−1| + |Lj | + 1 = 2γ˜ − 1 = |Lj+1|, then we have u˜′ ≤ 2δ(2γ˜−1)2+cj+1 +
2$ 2γ˜−12 %+1
1+cj+1
. When
cj+1 = 2, we have u˜′ ≤ 24 +
2 2γ˜−22 +1
3 < γ˜ ≤ u˜j . When cj+1 = 1, then (V5) implies that 2γ˜
is odd. Thus, we obtain u˜′ ≤ 2
2γ˜−1
2 +1
2 = γ˜ ≤ u˜j .
Finally, we consider the case of j = !−1. This case also satisfies |Lj−1|+|Lj |+1 ≥ 2γ˜−1.
Thus, from (V2), we have |L!−2|+ |L!−1|+ 1 ≥ 2|L!|− 1. Thus, it holds that
u˜′ =
δ(|L!−2|+ |L!−1|+ 1)
c!−2 + 1 + c!
+
) |L!−2|+|L!−1|+12 *+ 1 + |L!|
1 + c!
≤ 1
3
+
|L!−2|+ |L!−1|+ 2
1 + c!
.
If c! = 2, then at least one of |L!−2| and |L!−1| is even due to (V3). Thus, we have
u˜j =
δ(|L!−2|)
1 + c!−2
+ ) |L!−2|
2
*+ 1 + ) |L!−1|
2
*+ δ(|L!−1|)
3
≥ 1
3
+
|L!−2|+ |L!−1|+ 1
2
.
Hence, we have u˜′ ≤ u˜j . If c! = 1, then derived from (V6) we have |L!−1| = 0 and
|L!| = ) |L!−2|+12 *, which implies that
u˜′ =
δ(|L!−2|+ 1)
2 + c!−2
+
) |L!−2|+12 *+ 1 + ) |L!−2|+12 *
2
≤ δ(|L!−2|)
1 + c!−2
+ ) |L!−2|
2
*+ 1 = u˜j ,
26
where the last inequality comes from the fact that |L!−2| is even when c!−2 ≥ 2 as required
in (V3). !
Lemma 28 The utility of a player will be not improved by the relocation of (C4), if the
strategy profile fulfills (V2), (V4) and (V6).
Proof. We denote by u˜′ the utility of a player who moves to a vertex on θi.
Suppose that the player moves to θ1. If c1 = 1, then the new utility u˜′ becomes|L0|+1
2 ≤ γ˜, since |L1| = 0. Otherwise, that is c1 ≥ 2, we have
u˜′ ≤ 1
3
(|L0|+ 1 + ) |L1|2 *) +
δ(|L1|)
3 + c2
≤ 1
3
(|L0|+ 1 + |L1|− 12 ) +
1
4
≤ 2
3
γ˜ +
1
4
< γ˜.
The case that the player moves to θ! is shown in a similar way.
We next suppose that the player moves to θi with i $= 1, !. If ci = 1 and |Li−1| =
|Li| = 2γ˜ − 1, (V4) implies that |Li−1| and |Li| are even. Hence, we have
u˜′ ≤
|Li−1|
2 + 1 +
|Li|
2
2
= γ˜.
If |Li−1| < 2γ˜ − 1 or |Li| < 2γ˜ − 1, we have
u˜′ ≤ 1
3
+
|Li−1|−1
2 + 1 +
|Li|−1
2
2
+
1
3
≤ 4γ˜ − 3
4
+
2
3
< γ˜.
Finally, if ci ≥ 2, we have
u˜′ ≤ 1
4
+
|Li−1|−1
2 + 1 +
|Li|−1
2
3
+
1
4
≤ 2γ˜ − 1
3
+
1
2
< γ˜.
!
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